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In Ramadan 2013, the young anchor and comedian Akram Hosny hosted a satirical television 
show called Wasim Hudhud on the Egyptian satellite channel Dream 2. The thirty-episode series 
had an original premise: in 2053, a sixty-two-year-old historian named Wasim Hudhud narrates a 
program that describes the state of Egypt in 2013 to the young generation. The episodes covered 
a wide range of themes, including education, religion, sports, domestic politics, and international 
relations. Part of the show’s comedic effect came from imagining what would have happened if 
the Muslim Brotherhood had remained in power until 2053. The show was filmed prior to the 4 
July 2013 military coup, in which the minister of defense, Gen. ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, deposed 
the Brotherhood-affiliated president Muhammad Mursi after a wave of protests. There was no 
end in sight to the Mursi presidency at the time of filming, and the show imagines that the 
country’s plight would worsen dramatically over time. Exemplifying this satirical decline, the 
twenty-fifth episode began with a monologue explaining that the entertainment venue known as 
a “Sobky” was once called a movie theater, suggesting that all theaters were, unfortunately, 
showcasing Sobky movies by 2053.  
In 2013, I started to conduct ethnographic work on everyday practices of film production 
in Cairo, mainly at New Century Film Production and Al Batrik Art Production. My research 
included active observation on the set of Décor (2014), production and screenwriting work in 
Ward Masmum (Poisonous Roses, 2018), and interviews with numerous creative and technical 
workers across the industry.2 The term “Sobky” surfaced repeatedly in the course of my research. 
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Early on, I learned that the Sobkys were a family of successful film producers, and that the term 
“Sobky” had come to signify a genre of commercial entertainment with a narrative formula 
dubbed “the Sobky recipe” (al-khalta al-subkiyya). The cartoonist Islam Gawish illustrates the 
common perception of this recipe in figure 1. It combines a thug (baltagi), a baladi dancer, and a 
few comedic lines (iffihat) to create a successful action/musical/drama film in the mold of the 
wildly popular ‘Abdu Muta (Killer Abdo, 2012) or Qalb al-Asad (Lion Heart, 2013). These 
movies rank among the highest-grossing productions in the history of Egyptian cinema. ‘Abdu 
Muta has earned over twenty-two million Egyptian pounds in domestic theaters, while Qalb al-
Asad made around fourteen million pounds in the few days between its opening and the closure 
of every cinema in Cairo following the Rabi‘a Square massacre on 14 August 2013.3 Given that 
each production cost no more than ten million pounds to make, the profits from domestic ticket 
sales alone were dizzying.  
Since the 2011 revolution, the Sobky recipe has become so dominant that it seems as if 
the Sobkys are producing every movie in Egypt. Considering the Sobky genre’s immense 
success, it is surprising that recent scholarship on Egyptian cinema has neglected it. This neglect 
might be the result of a prevailing scholarly interest in pre-1990s cinema, prior to the Sobky era.4 
Yet even studies of post-revolutionary Egypt have not addressed the Sobky genre’s significance. 
Instead, scholars examine representations of political Islam in Egyptian cinema, majority-
minority relations, gender relations, “clean cinema,” or topical issues like drug consumption, 
migration, and protest.5 This neglect might be due to the implicit hierarchy of value that Walter 
Armbrust describes among students of Egyptian cinema, who deem world-renowned auteurs 
such as Youssef Chahine to be worthier of study than purveyors of lowbrow entertainment.6 The 
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contrast between the amount of scholarship on Chahine alone, as opposed to Sobky, is telling in 
this sense.7  
Scholarship on Egyptian cinema usually focuses on a given film’s narrative, historical 
context, and ideological underpinnings. Yet Sobky movies cannot be treated as autonomous texts 
in this way, because they are better understood as a series of film fragments with material and 
social effects beyond their projection in cinema halls.8 Analyzing the Sobky genre requires us to 
turn our attention to songs, Internet comics, talk shows, dubious dealings, and even red meat. 
This article also extends a line of investigation into the category of “the popular” begun by the 
cultural theorist Stuart Hall. For Hall, the popular does not merely designate works that are 
commercially successful or that derive from the practices and beliefs of an “authentic” working 
class. Rather, it is a site of struggle between dominant and subordinate class-cultural formations, 
whose boundaries are constituted by the struggle itself.9 Popular culture does not reflect essential 
class or cultural boundaries between “the people” and “the elite.” Rather, those categories 
emerge historically through conflicts over the meaning of the popular.  
Sobky films lay bare this dynamic. While appropriating narratives and markers of the so-
called popular (sha‘bi) classes in Cairo, these films fuel a highly profitable commercial 
enterprise. The Sobky brothers built this enterprise by exploiting workers to accumulate capital, 
which contrasts with the image that the producers project about being members of the popular 
classes. Without pointing out these contradictions, press and social media commentators criticize 
Sobky productions as being “vulgar” because they appear too “sha‘bi,” to use the local term. The 
categorical term sha‘bi describes an “authentic” Egyptian underclass in an essentialist manner. 
The term is associated with a cluster of unchanging cultural traits such as living in one of Cairo’s 
sha‘bi neighborhoods, speaking with a sha‘bi accent, attending sha‘bi weddings, and listening to 
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sha‘bi music. This cluster exists in historical suspension, as if there were a single “authentic” 
popular class with identifiable cultural traits outside the political, economic, and discursive 
pressures that shape the category of the popular and the people included in it.  
Building on Hall’s analysis, I argue that the cultural and material struggles over what is 
considered “popular” do not simply reflect class-cultural positions but also generate them. For 
instance, conflicts between the Sobkys and the press reveal a distinction between a moralizing 
middle-class public and a public that  this middle class considers both popular and vulgar. The 
struggle between the Sobkys and their workers, by contrast, reveals a distinction between 
entrepreneurs ascending the class-cultural ladder and their exploited labor force. Each struggle 
draws a different boundary between who or what counts as “popular.” In the first case, the 
Sobkys embody the popular masses; in the second, they embody the business elite. 
The Sobky genre illuminates the parameters of the struggle over what constitutes the 
popular in post-revolutionary Egypt. These parameters are not a simple binary between state-
sponsored highbrow culture and lowbrow street culture, as the English- and French-language 
scholarship on Egyptian popular culture would suggest.10 Rather, this struggle occurs in several 
areas: between a moralizing discourse on the Sobky genre’s vulgarity and the public image that 
the Sobky brothers cultivate; between wealthy producers and their workers; and between the 
music emerging from Cairo’s sha‘bi neighborhoods and the Sobkys’ appropriation of this music 
in video clips. This article addresses each of these conflicts in succession. I begin by analyzing 
the discourse of vulgarity surrounding Sobky productions in the press and online, then move to 
examining the Sobky brothers’ business practices, before concluding by discussing Sobky video 
clips as a highbrow form of sha‘bi music. 
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The Sobky Brand 
The story of the Sobky family starts in a small butcher shop in Dokki, on the western bank of the 
Nile in metropolitan Cairo. In the 1970s, Hassan El Sobky opened a stall on Tahrir Street, the 
major east-west artery in Dokki, which he later expanded into a larger shop. In 1985, Hassan’s 
sons Ahmed and Mohamed opened a video store above the butcher. As the business grew, the 
brothers established a reputation as major players in VHS distribution.11 Some film workers 
attribute Sobky productions’ commercial appeal to this initial business venture, which allegedly 
allowed the brothers to learn their popular audience’s taste.12 The Sobky brothers produced their 
first film, ‘Uyun al-Saqr (The Eyes of the Falcon), in 1992. They made many more box-office 
successes, notably comedies such as Sawwaq al-Hanim (The Lady’s Driver, 1994) and al-Limbi 
(2002). The Sobky brothers continued to produce films together until 2007, when a conflict 
between them led Mohamed to create a separate company. Together, these companies are among 
the most prolific producers of commercial films since the 2011 revolution, a period in which the 
Egyptian film industry’s established financiers have been unwilling to invest in production.13  
Journalists and film critics denounce the Sobkys as a scourge.14 While there are two 
Sobky brothers, the press often refers to them as a single “Sobky” and uses their pictures 
interchangeably, as if they were a metonym for light entertainment, obscene dialogue, and lewd 
imagery. Critics accuse the Sobkys of being interested in commercial gain at the expense of 
production quality and, indeed, moral integrity. They rarely direct such vitriol at other producers 
because they see them as creating a more cultured type of film or, at least, making honest profits 
while boosting the industry’s revenues. The press constantly denigrates the Sobkys’ success, 
however, with unavoidable overtones of class prejudice. They deem the brothers “crude” or 
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“lacking in refinement”: in short, “vulgar.”15 Armbrust analyzed a similar discourse of vulgarity 
directed at the sha‘bi singer Ahmad ‘Adawiyya in the 1980s and 1990s. Loved by many in Cairo, 
but hated by those committed to a modernist definition of high culture, ‘Adawiyya revealed a 
core contradiction in the so-called Egyptian middle class. Those who knew his tunes by heart and 
those who dismissed his music could very well be the same (middle-class) people. But by 
asserting ‘Adawiyya’s vulgarity, his detractors established a class-cultural distinction between a 
respectable, moral middle class and a vulgar, popular one.16 
The discourse of vulgarity surrounding the Sobkys reinforces a similar distinction. This 
discourse is most visible in the press’s regular invocation of their background as “butchers” 
(jazzarin). This label implies that the Sobkys are incompetent in the art of filmmaking and 
should stick to their lowly trade. The press extends this discourse to the Sobkys’ imagined 
audience as well: the male youth hailing from Cairo’s sha‘bi neighborhoods.17 One cliché 
portrayal of this audience is the sea of young men crowding ticket counters in downtown Cairo 
to see the latest box-office hit during Eid al-Fitr (fig. 2). Critics perceive these audiences, much 
like the Sobky brothers, as being tasteless, vulgar, and attracted to Sobky cinema in almost 
mimetic fashion.18 As the general manager of New Century Film Production, Ahmad Badawy, 
complained, “If you make a film that’s artistically good, people don’t go watch it. . . .They go 
watch [Sobky], and they just want to see a guy playing with a knife, with a few dancers, and 
that’s it.”19 Not all practitioners in the film industry share this disdainful view of the Sobkys’ 
audience. But many nonetheless assume that these audiences just want to “empty their minds” 
(fassi dimaghhum), to quote the assistant director Abdallah al-Ghaly.20 
The apparent contrast between high-culture cinema and the lowbrow way in which the 
Sobkys “sell movies like they sell meat,” according to a common cliché, cements an association 
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between the popular and the vulgar in the eyes of a moralizing public (fig. 3). The coarseness of 
the Sobky brothers’ own public image reinforces the disdain.21 This image was never as evident 
as in a well-known mishap on Tamer Amin’s talk show Min al-Akhir (The Last Word) on 20 
October 2014. The show invited Mohamed El Sobky to debate the late film magnate Mohamed 
Hassan Ramzy.22 After Ramzy made a veiled threat against his competitor’s upcoming 
production, Sobky’s anger mounted to the point where he emitted a vulgar grunt (shakhra), the 
Egyptian equivalent of saying the “f-word” on national television.23 The moment became an 
Internet meme (fig. 4). 
The Sobkys’ family background, public image, and imagined audience generate outrage 
in the press and on social media.24 During the Eid al-Adha season in 2013, a woman accused 
Ahmed El Sobky of touching her inappropriately while he was distributing tickets at Cinema 
Metro, a well-known downtown theater. Security camera records exonerated the producer some 
days later, but by then, the media frenzy over the vulgarity of Sobky films had morphed into fury 
at Ahmed himself.25 Earlier in 2013, protesters had launched an online campaign to boycott 
Sobky cinema on moral grounds (fig. 5–7).26 “We will boycott unseemliness (isfaf) during the 
Eid,” stated one slogan. Another warned, “Careful! Egypt is not a dancer and a thug!” In figure 
5, the image creator used red prohibition signs to signify the rejection of three commercial 
movies to be released that year, even though only one was actually produced by a Sobky 
company. The Sobkys’ opponents believe that the brothers and their films are contaminating 
public morals and the minds of sha‘bi male youth. The strong negative association is visible in 
the way in which some anti-sexual harassment campaigns have branded the Sobky brothers, their 
audiences, and their films as prime drivers of sexual harassment.27  
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This kind of confusion between the brother’s personalities, their products, and their 
consumers rests on two gendered assumptions that allow a moralizing public to constitute itself 
in contrast to the vulgar/popular classes. The first is that Sobky film audiences are 
unsophisticated and mindless men who cannot contain their cravings just as they cannot keep 
themselves from imitating popular cinema. This assumption is problematic because it portrays 
sexual harassment as the result of a moral flaw unique to sha‘bi men, ignoring the fact that 
middle- and upper-class men commit acts of patriarchal violence as well.28 Furthermore, this 
assumption ignores the gender diversity among Sobky film audiences. Consider how the crowd 
of young men in figure 2 contrasts with figure 8, which shows women crowding the ticket 
counters in a downtown theater to watch what could well be a Sobky film. The assumed 
masculinity of Sobky audiences contributes to a conception of the popular classes that presumes 
men to be the only watchers of public entertainment and restricts women to becoming either 
objects on screen or invisible domestic subjects.  
 The second assumption is that the Sobky brothers behave in a coarse manner and produce 
coarse films because they hail from a family of butchers. Of course, Ahmed and Mohamed El 
Sobky are only butchers to the extent that they inherited their father’s shop in Dokki, where 
Ahmed’s company is still located. Both brothers are university graduates: Ahmed in commerce 
and Mohamed in law. Clearly, their financial success squarely places them among the ascending 
entrepreneurial class that thrived under President Anwar al-Sadat’s economic liberalization 
policies (infitah). The Sobkys’ production capital grew from their VHS business in the 1980s, at 
a time when the medium was expanding wildly while the liberalizing national economy afforded 
advantageous tariffs. Furthermore, Sadat’s easing of restrictions on meat prices bolstered the 
butcher shop’s revenues.29 Thus, when their detractors refer to them as butchers, they express 
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class prejudice—disdain for what they view as the brothers’ lowly origins despite their newly 
and vulgarly acquired wealth, a common trope in high-culture criticism of the post-1970s 
nouveaux riches in Egypt.30  
While the Sobkys are not unambiguously “popular” in terms of their socioeconomic 
position, those who consider themselves to be educated, refined, and respectable portray the 
family as representatives of a uniformly vulgar/popular class. Yet the Sobkys’ educational 
background and wealth paints a different picture. One could argue that the numerous accusations 
of sexual harassment made by female workers against Mohamed El Sobky are not manifestations 
of a latent and uncontrollable popular male desire, but rather a typical case of a businessman 
abusing his professional status to harass colleagues with impunity.31 The Egyptian press seldom 
mentions this interpretation, even as it dutifully reports on rampant sexual abuses in Hollywood. 
This tendency indicates a strong bias toward considering the Sobkys exclusively through the lens 
of vulgarity, when they should also be seen as entrepreneurs trying to ascend the class-cultural 
ladder on the backs of their workers, in contrast with the “popular” spirit that the press deems 
them to embody. 
 
The Sobky Business 
The public discourse surrounding the Sobkys’ vulgarity is unlike the criticism that they face 
within the Egyptian film industry. It is impossible to meet any industry insider today who has no 
opinion on the Sobkys’ exploitative labor practices.32 Sandy Samuel, an assistant director who 
only recently began working in the industry, told me that she had heard that the Sobkys pay low 
salaries and cheat on payments.33 The production manager Mohammed Setohy, who has worked 
on several occasions with Mohamed El Sobky, had a more nuanced take. While Ahmed El 
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Sobky cheats workers out of their final payment, he explained, Mohamed always pays out what 
was agreed upon, even if he pays low wages. In another interview, I asked Setohy how Sobky 
manages to sign up workers at such low wages. He answered, “Sobky makes only one offer and 
says it’s all he can give, so people have to accept against their will.”34 Against their will, in this 
case, means against their ability to exert leverage in negotiations by pointing out other job 
possibilities or offers. In a labor market with scarce opportunities, having a job with a Sobky 
company is perhaps better than no job at all.  
 Samuel described how, in recent years, both Sobky brothers would wait until the 
Ramadan working season was over to hire workers at a much cheaper rate. Both brothers seek to 
sign their workers for multiple contracts to get a “bulk rate.” For example, Ahmed El Sobky’s 
company once contacted assistant director Habi Seoud.35 After discussion, Seoud found the 
salary unsatisfactory and declined the offer. Months later, Sobky’s production crew offered him 
two comparable deals. He refused twice, only to get a phone call from Ahmed El Sobky himself, 
summoning him to his office. Seoud met him above the butcher shop in Dokki. Sobky asked 
him, “Why don’t you want to work with me?” Seoud answered that the pay was unsatisfactory, 
even by the standards of poorly paid independent productions. Sobky made a counter-offer to 
contract him for eight films: five as an assistant director, three as a director. “The first one will 
be less well paid, but the second one is Kuwaiti money,” Sobky allegedly said, implying that the 
Kuwaiti advance on distribution would compensate for the salary difference.36 Seoud refused the 
offer because working with a Sobky company would have diminished his reputation as a 
director, but he semi-jokingly expressed remorse at not having taken such a stable job when he 
had little to no work. 
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 The Sobkys are constantly trying to save on production costs. This mindset is evidently 
common to all film producers: I have heard on numerous occasions producers justify cost-saving 
by claiming that they “fear for their money” (kha’ifin ‘ala fulushum). The lengths to which the 
Sobkys go, however, have become fabled among industry insiders. For instance, the Sobkys do 
not pay their actors and actresses well because they consider that showcasing them on screen in 
an expected box-office hit is enough compensation. According to the screenwriter and director 
Ahmed Fawzi Saleh, the megastar Mohamed Ramadan, who now commands a salary in the tens 
of millions, was only paid thirty thousand Egyptian pounds to make ‘Abdu Muta, one of the 
highest-grossing productions in the history of Egyptian cinema. To “temper the star’s 
enviousness” (yiksar ‘ainhu), in Fawzi Saleh’s words, Ahmed El Sobky gave him an expensive 
car. Likewise, the Sobky brothers gave the star Mohamed Saad a BMW after al-Limbi became a 
multi-million-pound success, perhaps because they had initially paid him peanuts.37 The 
production manager Setohy, for his part, recalled how Mohamed El Sobky grounded him 
because he had offered an actress a five-hundred-pound contract. It was a pittance compared to 
the ten thousand pounds that she had demanded, but Mohamed El Sobky was displeased. “What! 
I told you not to give her any money!” recalled a laughing Setohy, imitating the gruff producer.38 
According to multiple interlocutors, the Sobky brothers have even paid some workers with kilos 
of meat from their butcher shop. 
 Film workers perceive such cheapness as a symptom of general disrespect for their 
profession. “Cheapness” is not just a neutral description of the low wages given by the Sobkys, 
in this sense, but a way of expressing discontent at how capital owners treat their work force. All 
of my interlocutors decried the regularity with which the Sobkys pushed the limits of the 
conventional twelve-hour shift, although demanding overtime is common in the industry.39 
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“Sobky treats all his employees like bureaucrats (muwazzafin),” according to Setohy.40 He means 
that Mohamed El Sobky does not recognize or appreciate the differences in specialization among 
different crafts in film production. An employee is a body at his disposal, no matter his or her 
skillset, someone he can manipulate without respect for his or her position in the industry’s 
hierarchies. “Sobky buys people,” summarized the clapper Abdelsalam Radwan, who now 
refuses to work with the brothers, although he has done so in the past. In Radwan’s estimation, 
the Sobkys buy people and exploit them to the core, much like how they buy cameras and 
furnished apartments to limit long-term rental costs.41  
Workers also deem the Sobkys’ hands-on approach to the filmmaking process as 
disrespectful toward the industry’s professional standards and customs (‘urf). Unlike most 
producers in Egypt, the brothers regularly bypass the usual division of labor between the 
producer (muntij), who finances the movie, the line producer (muntij fanni), who manages 
logistics and budgeting, and the director, who makes creative decisions. The assistant director 
Osama Abol Ata, who worked with Mohamed El Sobky on three projects, described him as a 
“real” producer in this sense. “He reads the script, he reads the breakdown (tafrigh), he’s always 
there in person, on location. . . . He knows how to take care of his product.”42 Film workers do 
not widely share this opinion, however, and instead tend to see the producer’s involvement on set 
as an encroachment on their territory. 
I had a brief glimpse of an Ahmed El Sobky shoot at Studio Misr, one of the largest and 
oldest studios in Egypt.43 It was late, maybe ten or eleven at night, and I was standing next to 
studio number one with the production assistant Hany Abdel Latif. The driver Diab arrived with 
a van full of props for an upcoming shoot and assistants started to unload it. As I was watching, 
Diab asked Abdel Latif who I was. “He’s a spy from Sobky,” he joked. Diab began cursing 
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Sobky in a jocular tone and prayed that his employer’s movies would win at the box office: 
“Inshallah New Century will overtake Sobky!” I thought that Abdel Latif was joking as usual 
about my spy-like presence on set. New Century crew members grew used to describing my 
incessant questions and note-taking in this way. My nickname at New Century was “Mr. X,” the 
spoof gangster character played by the star comedian Fouad el-Mohandes in the 1970s, allegedly 
the “most dangerous man in the world.”  
On this occasion, however, the reference was timely. Sobky was shooting on Studio 
Misr’s alleyway (hara) set. This set is supposed to mimic a generic sha‘bi neighborhood in 
Cairo, but it is more akin to the stereotyped space imagined as a hara in Egyptian cinema.44 
Sobky’s crew had only minimally modified the permanent set, which, according to Diab, 
reflected Sobky’s cost-effective approach: “Sobky never builds a set, and [he] pays everyone 
very little.” He astutely remarked that there were no production cars on set, a sign of Sobky’s 
unwillingness to invest in his movies. Diab echoed Sandy Samuel’s point about how the Sobkys 
bind workers to several projects in the low season to drive wages down. On a stage covered with 
a stereotypical ornamented wedding tent, the actresses Ayten Amer and Horeya Farghaly, along 
with a young dancer, were the only women visible among hundreds of men. The men included 
the main singer, Tarek El Sheikh, his band, the extras watching the show, and the film crew.45 
Ahmed El Sobky himself was directing the actors, positioning them on stage and barking orders 
to the cameraman on the crane. Diab argued that the director was very weak: “[He] doesn’t know 
what he’s saying. . . . [The director] keeps asking for lens changes, and Sobky says, ‘keep 
rolling.’” Film workers usually perceive such interventions as a professional faux pas at best and 
an affront to artistic creation at worst.  
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Given these production practices, industry insiders do not perceive the Sobky brothers to 
be mere representatives of a vulgar/popular class, but as entrepreneurs with little respect for their 
workers. In fact, many insiders see the Sobkys’ willingness to invest in film production after the 
2011 revolution as their most important contribution to the commercial film industry. “I admire 
him, but I wouldn’t work with him [Sobky],” said the screenwriter and director Daoud Abdel 
Sayed.46 In a similar spirit, the producer and editor Mohamed Samir told me, “You know what? I 
have no problem with Sobky.”47 After reading the overwhelmingly negative coverage of Sobky 
productions in the press, I had not expected that Abdel Sayed and Samir, two filmmakers who 
strive to create an alternative to the mainstream cinema represented by the Sobkys, would have 
such a conciliatory view. Samir respected the Sobkys’ commercial vocation and the fact that 
they, unlike larger production houses, do not pretend to balance art and entertainment. The well-
known screenwriter Mariam Naoum echoed this view in 2013, stating that “a lot of people talk 
about Sobky with arrogance, but the reality is, he’s the only one still producing in the market.”48 
She added that the major investors who kept their money in their pockets are responsible for the 
industry’s bad shape. Ahmed Fawzi Saleh went further, arguing that without the Sobkys,  theater 
audiences would have disappeared after 2011, and it would have been impossible to bring them 
back. 
Indeed, the Sobkys have become successful not because of their popular roots, but 
because their productions have faced so little competition in domestic theaters after 2011 and 
because their business model has maximized gains by cutting labor costs. Thus, the Sobkys’ 
success is not inherent to a specific class-based appeal but tied to the political-economic juncture 
in which it has occurred. The independent director and producer Hala Galal summarized this 
juncture by calling the Sobkys the “clowns” (arajuz) of the contemporary film industry.49 She 
15 
 
contrasts the brothers, who create the lowbrow mass entertainment in theaters, with the much 
more powerful production houses that have wide distribution networks, own theaters and 
maintain strong relations with state institutions. In Galal’s metaphor, the Sobkys broker capital 
gains without owning “serious” fixed capital or maintaining serious relations with the security 
apparatus. 
In 2013, the cinema journalist Walid Abul Seoud was adamant that the brothers did not 
have a sustainable production model for this very reason. In his view, the Sobkys had become 
ruthless (tawahhashu) because they controlled a very large share of the domestic exhibition 
market without owning theaters of their own. He added that the Sobkys would soon collapse 
because their movies had been exploiting a fashionable “dancer-and-thug” narrative, but that 
they would have a hard time once the fashion fades away.50 On an earlier occasion, he argued 
that Karim El Sobky would run his father Ahmed’s business into the ground by changing the 
Sobky brand and making American-style movies. “The market can’t stomach it,” he 
speculated.51 Since 2013, none of Abul Seoud’s predictions have materialized. Neither 
production practice, nor genre, nor aesthetics seem to have diminished the Sobkys’ commercial 
success. This continued commercial appeal is not simply due to the brothers’ so-called recipe, 
however, but also to the historical juncture in which they have emerged. 
The Sobkys’ business and labor practices squarely position them as the kind of 
entrepreneurs who cannot be subsumed under a blanket notion of the popular. There is a 
structural difference between the way in which the Sobkys accumulate capital and the way in 
which most wage workers make a living in sha‘bi neighborhoods, but this difference is flattened 
when journalists, film critics, and most of my interlocutors assign the Sobkys to the realm of the 
popular as if they were automobile mechanics, low-level bureaucrats, or even butchers. 
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Furthermore, film workers’ antipathy to the brothers’ way of doing business—driving down 
wages, breaking industry norms, and even “buying people”—shows why the Sobkys cannot be 
considered simply “of the people,” as some press and social media commentators allege them to 
be. Comparing the Sobkys’ public image and their production practices highlights this 
contradiction. The Sobkys are business owners who are made out to be members of the 
vulgar/popular classes, when in fact, they appropriate popular tropes to enhance their ability to 
accumulate capital. The following section demonstrates why Sobky products cannot be conflated 
with other forms of popular cultural production, since the brothers’ production practices and their 
products are aesthetically and materially distinct.  
 
The Sobky Video Clip 
Journalists and film critics often associate the commercial success of Sobky films with the 
family’s roots in the “authentic” culture of Cairo’s sha‘bi neighborhoods, which supposedly 
brings them closer to their imagined popular, male, young audiences. Two considerations 
problematize this association. First, as I have detailed, the Sobky brothers are commercial 
producers engaging in a process of capital accumulation no different in its exploitation of 
workers than other production houses. Workers are not well paid or well treated on Sobky 
productions, which cannot sit well with the image of an “authentically” sha‘bi production house. 
When journalists, social media commentators, and my interlocutors talk about the sha‘bi classes, 
they assume that it is a subculture in which inequality and exploitation result from external 
pressures from government and big business upon Cairo’s underclasses. The Sobkys’ business 
practices contradict this assumption, to the extent that they engage in the very capital 
accumulation and labor exploitation that commentators deem external to the vulgar/popular 
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realm. This is not to say that there is an ideal mode of popular production in which wages are fair 
and industry norms are respected. Rather, I am pointing out the contradiction in a discourse that 
assigns Sobky productions to a vulgar/popular class without acknowledging how they reproduce 
the same practices as the mainstream film industry, or how these practices differ from other types 
of cultural production in sha‘bi neighborhoods.  
Second, what draws people to watch Sobky films is not some mimetic impulse among the 
popular classes to see themselves represented on screen. As Iman Hamam argues, the kind of 
popular culture exemplified by Sobky productions is “a ‘ventriloquised’ version of the ‘manners 
and customs’ of the Egyptian people in ‘traditional quarters.’”52 The audience relates to the 
Sobky genre in a more complex and fragmented manner, notably through video clips. More than 
the repetitive storylines, Sobky music videos offer an important site for audience engagement 
with the genre beyond the few weeks in which films are shown in theaters. Daniel Gilman argues 
that “sha‘bi has a lesser visual presence than other musical genres in Egypt,” because it is not 
“captured in filmed concert performances and television broadcasts.”53 Gilman restricts sha‘bi 
video clips to a narrow range of productions beyond the cinema industry, which misses the 
importance of Sobky video clips to the contemporary sha‘bi genre. 
 Each Sobky company regularly uploads teasers, trailers, and video clips to its YouTube 
channel. Songs excerpted from films are by far the most widely watched clips on these 
channels.54 Judging by the frequency with which cafés, microbuses, and motorcycles blast these 
songs, they are undoubtedly the most widespread iteration of Sobky entertainment. For instance, 
the song that I watched being filmed at Studio Misr featured in a film called Salim Abu Ukhtu 
(2014). While the film was a minor box-office success, the song has been viewed around seven-
and-a-half million times on Ahmed El Sobky’s YouTube page, and played some three million 
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more times on SoundCloud. Given how viral they become on satellite television and online, 
video clips act as effective advertising tools. Consequently, crew members shoot them as free-
standing units without direct links to the narrative. Film critics tend to attack the lack of 
connection between musical numbers and narrative in Sobky films, although this disjunction 
makes sense within the tradition of Egyptian song-and-dance cinema.55 The Sobkys’ major 
contribution to the aesthetics of Egyptian cinema is that they revived this commercial song-and-
dance tradition, albeit in a form that most critics would characterize as “vulgar.”56 
The broad genre under which Sobky songs fall is locally known as sha‘bi music. 
Specialists in Egyptian music have long debated what defines the genre, but they have not settled 
upon a single, substantive definition because the genre’s contours shift in relation to other genres 
and over time. Scholars apply the term sha‘bi to whatever music contrasts with the “high 
culture” promoted by the Egyptian state and the professional youth music industry driven by 
satellite television channels.57 As Nicolas Puig argues, the label sha‘bi “implicitly contains a 
value judgment, not only about music itself but also about the audiences that it mainly targets . . . 
overall, the representatives of the working classes and the lower-middle classes.”58 The 
commercial genre most call sha‘bi music today emerged with the spread of audiocassettes in the 
1970s. The new medium provided an infrastructure for recording and distributing music that 
high-culture settings like the national radio would not broadcast. Following the spread of 
synthesizers and the MP3 revolution, a new genre known as mahrajanat (“festival” music) 
emerged with a distinctive syncopated rhythm struck by unrelenting cymbals. Rugged, nasal, 
mostly male voices characterize these iterations of sha‘bi music, even though the mahrajanat 
producers use auto-tuned voices profusely.59 The rhythm alternates between slow sections—
sometimes sung in the style of a mawwal (lament), other times in a spoken-word tone—and 
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faster sections that repeat the chorus to a joyous dancing tune. Instrumentation varies in 
combinations between the flute (nay), the violin (kaman), various drums (duff, ri’, tabla), and the 
synthesizer (org). These musicians address themes inspired by situations and issues from lived 
experiences in Cairo’s sha‘bi neighborhoods.  
Sobky video clips recuperate both old and new iterations of sha‘bi music, but with a 
distinct aesthetic shaped by their relatively high production value. This difference illuminates 
another aspect of the struggle over the definition of the popular in Sobky productions. The 
Sobkys appropriate sha‘bi musical references to fuel the very capital accumulation that 
distinguishes their products from sha‘bi music made outside the film industry. This struggle is 
not inherent in a pre-existing class-cultural difference between the Sobky brothers and their 
competitors, just as the Sobkys cannot be univocally characterized as vulgar producers or 
bourgeois entrepreneurs. Rather, the brothers enact this difference through their production 
methods and the specific aesthetics that their products embody. One can read Sobky video clips 
as enacting a separation between a highbrow and a lowbrow form of sha‘bi music in this sense. 
Unlike the distinction between high and low culture described by other scholars of Egyptian 
popular culture, it is not state-sanctioned intellectuals who set the terms of this hierarchy of 
value, but the very actors working within the culture industries. 
The distinctive aesthetic of Sobky video clips is above all visible in their setting and 
shooting style. A typical clip occurs in one of two locations: a cabaret or a sha‘bi wedding. Both 
locations have historically been central to the performance of sha‘bi music, and the Sobkys have 
both available to them at cheap rates. In a typical film, when the main characters arrive at the 
cabaret or wedding, they disappear into a large crowd of young men watching the song. These 
men stand in for the imagined audience of Sobky movies, inviting a sha‘bi male gaze upon the 
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dancer and the singer. The title video clip of Halawat Ruh (Ruh’s Beauty/The Sweetness of a 
Soul, 2014) illustrates this well. The clip features the well-known sha‘bi singer Hakim and, 
exceptionally, the star Haifa Wehbe herself as a dancer. The filmmakers shot the video in such a 
way as to attract the viewer’s attention to Wehbe’s body, with multiple detailed shots of her feet, 
hips, torso, and legs, and of the male audience looking on in bewilderment. The editing is rapid, 
shifting between inserts on the dancer, the singer, the main characters, and the overall party.  
The video clip has a distinct sound aesthetic. The film suddenly shifts from on-location 
sound, with all its imperfections and “dirty” noises, to crystal-clear studio sound. Hakim’s voice 
dominates the screen, backed by impeccably balanced instruments. The sound quality differs 
noticeably from sha‘bi music audiocassettes, MP3s, or clips broadcast on specialist sha‘bi 
satellite channels. While stereotypes associated with Sobky songs include mindless joy, fast 
dance moves, and a hammered chorus, the lyrics in “Halawat Ruh” are deeper in unexpected 
ways. The clip exploits a tension between the song and the image that creates the specific Sobky 
brand of highbrow sha‘bi music videos. The Sobky brothers built this brand not only on higher 
production values, but also on the attempt to showcase “respectable” narratives in song. Consider 
the opening lament in “Halawat Ruh”: 
O you who likes beauty, the sweet one’s sweetness is in the soul. 
There are very beautiful people with a sweet soul. 
What’s the use of beauty if you live with it scarred? 
Beware of feeling pride in beauty or being deceived by it,  
Because if beauty makes you arrogant, it will scorch you with the fire of its nights.  
Whatever beauty there is, tomorrow it will all be gone.  
The love of the flesh is not eternal, but what is eternal is the sweetness of a soul.  
 
The moral implied by these lyrics could not contrast more starkly with Wehbe’s lascivious 
dance, the camera’s delight in her bodily movements, and the male crowd’s reaction to the scene. 
Here again, the Sobky genre’s ambiguous position emerges between the popular and the 
respectable middle class, except that the Sobky clip itself claims respectability.  
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The film Halawat Ruh incited a moral panic in which this complex relationship to 
respectability played out. The movie is an adaptation of the Italian film Malèna, starring Monica 
Bellucci as a widow forced into prostitution after her husband goes to war. The choice of Haifa 
Wehbe for the Egyptian version combined her box-office power with her sexually illicit aura, 
which derives from her long career as a singer in sultry pop video clips broadcast on Gulf-based 
satellite television channels. Wehbe’s casting in itself would have been enough to attract 
criticism from the press and social media commentators, but the panic grew when rumors arose 
that the film featured a scene in which an underage boy touched or paid to have sex with Wehbe. 
The attacks became so vehement that the government censored the film in an unorthodox fashion 
before its scheduled release in April 2014. Although the Censorship Authority had cleared the 
film’s theatrical release, Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahlab reversed the decision and banned the 
film after an unprecedented emergency meeting with the Cinema Industry Chamber.  
In response to the ban, Mohamed El Sobky came out to defend his film in numerous 
newspaper and television interviews.60 He complained of the debts that he had accumulated in 
making his film as well as the prime minister’s use of extralegal authority to censor it. Yet he 
also made a moral argument. On Tony Khalife’s show Ajra’ al-Kalam (The Most Audacious 
Talk), Sobky claimed that the rumors about the illicit scene were unfounded. In fact, he said, his 
film was showing Wehbe’s lifestyle in order to set an example of what not to do.61 He claimed 
that his films displayed bad behavior in order to enjoin his audiences to avoid it, and he assured 
Khalife’s viewers that not a single scene would ever contravene public morals. Sobky’s 
perspective is not uncontroversial, which Khalife highlighted repeatedly. It shows, however, that 
Sobky sought to position himself amid a widespread moral panic not just as an entrepreneur, and 
certainly not as a vulgar producer, but as a patriarch with respectable objectives. The film was 
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eventually released in domestic theaters after a court decision in November 2014. The publicity 
generated by its censorship made it a box-office success.62  
Many Sobky video clips reveal this kind of moral positioning, including the most-
watched one since 2016: the feature song of the comedy Ocean 14, entitled “Ah Laww La‘ibt Ya 
Zahr” (Oh, If the Dice Could Roll My Way, 2016). Performed by Ahmad Shiba, the song 
garnered hundreds of millions of views on YouTube.63 Like “Halawat Ruh,” the clip has high 
production value, a glamorous dancer, and pristine sound quality, while the song’s main theme is 
a classic mawwal lamenting the link between financial debt and social indebtedness.  
Whoever is owed money doesn’t sleep, imagine whoever owes any. 
God damn you, poverty, you have turned me over to the rascals. 
You humiliated a proud man because he’s penniless. 
God damn you, neediness, the humiliation of the question [asking for money] is lethal. 
Oh, if only the dice could roll my way, and the circumstances changed, 
And I took the first ride on the road to wealth, 
I’ll go to the first person I needed to ask [for money]. 
He dashed my hopes at the time and made me taste the bitterness of poverty.  
I’ll do what’s right by him, and support him if he wavers, 
And stand by him in hard times and be patient.  
 
The theme of male friendship being made and unmade by poverty and debt recalls a number of 
sha‘bi musical laments, such as the opening of Ahmad ‘Adawiyya’s version of “Ya Bta‘ al-
Tuffah” (Oh Apple Seller):  
O world, who did you go for, and who are you still going for? 
Who did you go for, and who will you go for? 
I played all the cards, poor me, and I found bitterness in the joker. 
I’m the one who bought friends, and they’re the ones who sold me. 
I’m the one who cared for friends, and they’re the ones who let me down. 
When I got my luck back, o fate, my friends [‘awazli] begrudged me. 
 
‘Adawiyya’s opening is steeped in bitterness toward his former friends: the cycle of debt and 
indebtedness broke their bonds. In “Ah Laww La‘ibt Ya Zahr,” by contrast, the narrator takes a 
moral high ground. After being dragged into debt and tasting the social humiliation that it 
involves, he vows to remain in solidarity with whoever did not support him when he had no 
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money. While remaining within an older sha‘bi musical and lyrical tradition, the video clip is 
distinguished by its high production value and moral position. This distinction encapsulates the 
Sobky brothers’ struggle to articulate a highbrow version of popular entertainment. This version 
reflects their appropriation of the setting, style, and issues lived by residents of Cairo’s sha‘bi 
neighborhoods and their broader objective of accumulating capital as respectable entrepreneurs. 
 
Conclusion 
Ahmed Fawzi Saleh once told me that the Sobkys “embody the failure of modernism in 
Egypt.”64 He was quoting from Armbrust’s Mass Culture and Modernism, an important 
reference for scholars of popular culture in Egypt. The book explores the tension between a 
modernist high culture promoted by the Egyptian state and the subversions of this culture in 
lowbrow entertainment such as magazines, songs, televised plays, TV serial dramas, and 
commercial cinema. According to Fawzi Saleh, the university as a modernist institution had 
failed the Sobky brothers (because they did not find jobs in their respective fields), so they 
decided to invest in the VHS business. This new technology allowed them to enter the film 
market, where they began by producing films with a high-culture aspiration, working with 
renowned directors such as Ali Badrakhan and the late Mohamed Khan. Yet their initial 
investment in high culture was not profitable, which, Fawzi Saleh said, prompted the Sobkys to 
enter “the postmodern era.” They became set on making cheap, mass entertainment films that 
broke all cinematic conventions, beginning with al-Limbi (2002). 
Fawzi Saleh’s interpretation of the Sobky story is not just interesting because it engages 
with Euro-American scholarship, but because he attends to the Sobkys’ position within the 
contested category of “popular culture.” While Fawzi Saleh traces a broad shift from modernism 
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to postmodernism, I have traced a series of struggles between the Sobkys and the press, their 
critics on social media, their workers, and their competitors in sha‘bi music production. The 
Sobky genre cannot be understood as an unproblematic representation of Egyptian popular 
culture in this sense. Nor can we simply define the Sobkys’ version of popular entertainment 
through a binary opposition against the state’s modernist program. This article has shown how 
Sobky films illuminate the contours of multiple struggles constituting multiple class-cultural 
formations, whether between an educated middle class and the vulgar/popular classes, 
exploitative entrepreneurs and their exploited work force, or highbrow and lowbrow sha‘bi 
musical production. The Sobkys cannot sit unambiguously in any of these categories, because 
their peculiar position and their specific mode of capital accumulation emerge on several fronts 
in these struggles. Each struggle—each set of historical, political, economic, social parameters—
shapes the category of “the popular” in contemporary Egypt. 
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